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Abstract 
 
Big Data Science, which combines large data sets with 
techniques from statistics and machine learning, is 
beginning to reach the social sciences. The promise of 
this approach to investigation are considerable, allowing 
researchers to establish correlations between variables 
over huge numbers of participants using data that has 
been gathered in a non-invasive fashion and in natural 
settings.  
 
Unlike large-data projects in the physical sciences, 
however, use of these data sets in the social sciences 
require that the subjects generating the data be treated in 
a fair an ethical fashion. This is often taken as requiring 
either compliance with the common rule, or that the data 
be de-identified to insure the privacy of the subjects. 
 
But de-identification turns out to be far more difficult 
than one might think. In particular, the ability to re-
identify subjects from a set of attributes that can be 
linked to other data sets has led to a number of 
mechanisms, such as k-anonymity or l-diversity, that 
attempt to define technical solutions to the de-
identification problem. 
 
But these mechanisms are not without their cost. Recent 
work has shown that de-identification of a data set can 
introduce statistical bias into that data, making the 
results extracted by analysis of the de-identified set vary 
significantly from those same analyses applied to the 
original set. 
 
In this paper, we will look at how this bias is introduced 
when a particular form of de-identification, k-
anonymity, is applied to a particular large data set 
generated by the Massive Open On-line Courses 
(MOOCs) offered by Harvard and MIT. We will discuss 
some of the tensions that arise between privacy and big-
data science as a result of this bias, and look at some of 
the ways that have been proposed to avoid the trade-off 
between accurate science and privacy. Finally, we will 
outline a promising new approach to de-identification 
which appears to avoid much of the bias introduction, at 
least on the data set in question. 
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1  Introduction  
 
Studies based on large-scale data sets and techniques from 
statistics, jointly labeled “big data science”, are beginning 
to make their appearance in the social sciences, medicine, 
and education. While these techniques have been used in 
the physical sciences for some time, their application in 
these new areas raise concerns about the privacy of the 
subjects of the studies. De-identifying the data sets so that 
those sets can be shared for further investigation or for 
verification of results has been the goal for these fields, but 
the goal has been particularly difficult to achieve in 
practice.  
 
The first worry raised by de-identification attempts 
centered around the ease with which naively de-identified 
sets could be linked to other, easily accessible, datasets to 
re-identify the participants in the study. A number of 
studies have shown how surprisingly little data can be 
linked to outside data sets to re-identify individuals [1, 2]. 
These concerns led to a number of enhanced technical 
definitions of de-identification, including k-anonymity [3], 
l-diversity [4] and differential privacy [5]. Each of these 
frameworks attempts to provide a technical solution that 
allows sharing of data about human subjects without 
allowing (or at least making it very difficult to) re-
identification of the individuals whose data is shared. 
 
More recent work has raised a new concern about de-
identified data sets. An early study of de-identifying the 
data sets for students of MOOCs offered by Harvard and 
MIT through the edX platform showed that de-identifying 
those sets so that they were 5-anonymous introduced 
significant statistical bias into the de-identified set [6]. 
Similar results have called into question the accuracy of 
data sets protected by differential privacy [7].  
 
While these results are preliminary, they pose a dilemma 
for the researcher wanting to use big data techniques in the 
social sciences. Privacy requirements mean that the raw 
data used cannot be openly shared. But science requires 
both the ability for others to reproduce and check your 
results, and the ability for others to extend and enhance an 
analysis using the data that was used by others. But if de-
identification introduces significant statistical bias into a 
data set, sharing of that de-identified set is a disservice to a 
field, as researchers using that data set will come to 
erroneous conclusions. 
 
In what follows, we will look at some of the possible ways 
of slipping between the horns of this dilemma. We will 
look at the technical background of the problem, but also 
entertain the kinds of policy solutions that might be 
possible. We will end by describing a technical solution 
that offers some hope. 
 
2  Context  
 
In what follows, we will frame out discussion around the 
de-identification of a particular data set, the person-course 
dataset generated from the MOOC courses offered by 
Harvard and MIT through the edX platform during the 
years 2014 and 2015. The dataset contains 3,040,773 
records. Each record records information about a single 
student’s interaction with a single course. Information 
includes basic demographic information such as age, level 
of education, and gender, as well as information about the 
interaction of the student with the course including 
completion status, number of forum posts, performance on 
quizzes, and the like. Each record contains 132 fields for 
each student, although some of the fields may be empty.  
 
We chose our de-identification standard based on the legal 
requirements as best we could understand them. We took 
these records to be educational records associated with 
Harvard and MIT; in the United States such records are 
governed by the Family Educational Rights to Privacy Act 
(FERPA). Like many laws, this one is less than clear on 
the privacy requirements, but the best interpretation we 
could find [8] required that prior to openly sharing the 
information, the data set needs to be de-identified using to 
a standard of k-anonymity, where k = 5. Note that we are 
not claiming that de-identifying the data set in this fashion 
will guarantee that no subject in the data set cannot be re-
identified. We are simply saying that we have followed the 
legal rules set up to protect the privacy of the subjects. 
 
We begin by removing all direct identifiers from the data 
set; these include such fields as name, address, and obvious 
directory information. Once this is done, the first step 
towards de-identification is to determine the set of quasi-
identifiers in the data set. Quasi-identifiers are those entries 
in the data set that could be used to connect this data set 
with other data sources. Only a surprisingly small number 
of such quasi-identifiers are needed to re-identify a subject; 
in the classic case the combination of zip, birth date, and 
gender can be used to link a medical record in which 
directory information has been removed to a voter list that 
re-identifies the subject, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Combination of two data sets that allow re-
identification (from [3]).  
 
Of the 132 fields in the data set, only six fields were 
judged to be quasi-identifiers: the course itself, gender, 
country, year of birth, level of education, and number of 
forum posts (because the forums were public, and anyone 
could scrape the forums for any class). It would seem that 
it would be easy to find a mechanism to insure that, for any 
combination of these six identifiers, there would be at least 
5 entries in the set that had identical values.  
 
Two mechanisms are used to de-identify such a data set. 
The first, generalization, joins distinct values into a more 
general range to increase the number of records that report 
the range of values. For example, we could generalize the 
year of birth by giving a range of years, joining all the 
records for the multiple years into a single reported value. 
 
The second mechanism used to achieve k-anonymity is 
suppression of particular records. If a record is difficult to 
generalize in such a way that it can be made k-anonymous, 
the record can be suppressed from the set. 
 
Given the large number of records in the set and the small 
number of quasi-identifiers, the first mechanism used to 
produce a 5-anonymous data set favored suppression over 
generalization. The intuition was that, with such a small 
number of quasi-identifiers, the number of suppressed 
records would be small. We were surprised to find that this 
was not at all the case; in analysis of the resulting data set 
we discovered that approximately 20% of the records in 
the original set were suppressed. Moreover, the records 
that were suppressed tended to be the ones that the 
researchers found most interesting. There were lots of 
students who would sign up for a MOOC course and then 
do little or nothing else; from a k-anonymity point of view 
all of these students look the same and thus were retained 
in the de-identified set. Students who completed the 
course, on the other hand, had far more variation in their 
data (especially with respect to forum posts) and were thus 
more likely to be suppressed by the simple approach. 
 
These anomalies, and some anecdotal evidence that this 
sort of thing had occurred in other, unrelated, data sets 
motivated a more detailed and directed study in the ways 
that data sets could be k-anonymized, and what the effects 
of those k-anonymization techniques were on the statistical 
properties of the set; the results of that work can be found 
in [9] and [10]. In summary, these works found that the 
mechanisms for k-anonymization, suppression and 
generalization, each introduced a different form of 
statistical bias. Suppression of individual records tended to 
bias the means of individual quasi-identifier values, while 
generalization tended to introduce bias in the correlation 
between the quasi-identifier values. The higher the level of 
generalization, the less suppression needed to be performed 
(although we found no level of generalization that 
completely eliminated the need for suppression). Our 
preliminary conclusion, at the end of this study, was that 
there was no way of reaching a level of 5-anonymity that 
did not distort the data to such a degree that sharing the 
data would be of scientific use. 
 
3  The Tensions  
 
If there is no way to de-identify data sets without 
introducing significant bias into those sets, we are 
presented with a dilemma when attempting to do big data 
science on human subjects. It is difficult to advocate that 
this sort of science should not rest on the ability to share 
the data on which conclusions are based, both to allow 
checking of results and to allow new questions to be 
addressed. But if sharing requires either degrading the 
utility of the data set or exposing the people represented in 
the set, we seem to be forced into a choice between good 
science and privacy. 
 
One possible way out of this dilemma is to change the way 
in which we guarantee the privacy of the subjects whose 
data is contained in the set. Current notions of k-
anonymity, l-diversity, or differential privacy all rest on the 
notion that privacy is preserved when the data does not 
allow the re-identification of the subjects. In effect, these 
approaches all assume that anonymity is the guarantor of 
privacy. 
 
This connection between privacy and anonymity is, on 
investigation, not obvious a priori. One discussion of this 
can be found in the recent report from the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology report on 
big data and privacy [11]. This report notes that there are 
activities that are private but not anonymous (for example, 
voting) and also activities that are anonymous but not 
private (such as some political pamphlets). This report 
suggests that a more fruitful approach to privacy in the era 
of big data would rely on restrictions on how the data is 
used rather than on the form of the data itself. 
 
Such an approach would change the interaction between 
big data and privacy in a fundamental way. Rather than 
trying to insure that no privacy violations could occur by  
any analysis of the data, this approach would try to audit, 
find, and punish those who violated the privacy of 
individuals by misusing the data. Identification or re-
identification would be such a misuse. Rather than trying 
to avoid privacy violations before the fact, this approach 
would find privacy violations once they had occurred. 
 
The emphasis on use has its own set of technical 
challenges. In particular, data sets would need to be 
marked or their provenance tracked in such a way that 
after-the-fact privacy violations could be detected. On the 
other hand, this approach would allow researchers to share 
the original data sets, with all of the information intact, 
meaning that there would be no statistical bias introduced.  
 
But the real problem with this approach is not technical, 
but legal and political. Making such a change would 
require re-writing many of the regulations and laws that are 
used to protect human subjects in research. This may 
dismay many in the field of data science, as technical 
problems can be worked on at the speed of technology 
change, while policy changes occur at the speed of 
bureaucracy.  
 
4  Some Technology Hope  
 
As a technologist, I would be remiss if I did not end on a 
note of technological hope. While the current literature 
seems to indicate that de-identifying a data set will neither 
insure the impossibility of leaking private information nor 
allow accurate science to be done on that data set, there is 
some research that is showing some signs that a more 
careful approach to de-identification may avoid some of 
these pitfalls. Recent work by the author and his 
collaborators has re-visited the techniques used to achieve 
k-anonymity on the MOOC data set with some 
encouraging initial results [12].  
 
On this approach, rather than simply generalizing numeric 
values into bins of a particular size to aid in k-anonymity, 
the binning has been done in a fashion that will adjust the 
bins to minimize the variation of each of the members in 
the bin to the mean value of all the members. To do this 
optimally is computationally infeasible, so we have instead 
relied on a greedy approximation that terminates in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
 
As with more common forms of generalization, this led to 
a data set that was not fully 5-anonymous. Rather than 
suppressing the records that violated 5-anonymity, we 
added chaff. These are synthetic records having the same 
set of quasi-identifiers as those that needed to be made 5-
anonymous, with the value of other fields being picked 
randomly from the values of those fields in the entire set. 
 
We found that this combination of mechanisms gave us a 
5-anonymous data set with almost no added statistical bias; 
those interested in the details should consult the original 
paper. Note also that these results are preliminary; they 
need to be generalized to see if they work as well with 
other, unrelated data sets. 
 
Even if these results are generally useful, they do not 
guarantee privacy, only k-anonymity. But doing this 
without introducing statistical bias would itself be an 
advance in the state of the art, and we are hopeful that the 
future results will confirm our initial findings. 
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